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CHAIM SAIMAN∗ 
 
Public Law, Private Law, and Legal Science 
This essay explores the historical and conceptual connections 
between private law and nineteenth century classical legal science 
from the perspective of German, American, and Jewish law. In each 
context, legal science flourished when scholars examined the confined 
doctrines traditional to private law, but fell apart when applied to 
public, administrative and regulatory law. Moving to the 
contemporary context, while traditional private law scholarship 
retains a prominent position in German law and academia, 
American law has increasingly shifted its focus from the language of 
substantive private law to a legal regime centered on public and 
procedural law. The essay concludes by raising skepticism over recent 
calls to reinvigorate the Euro-American dialogue by focusing on 
traditional private law and scholarship. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Haferkamp’s paper concisely details the rise and fall 
of an autonomous legal science in Germany. According to Professor 
Haferkamp, the beginning of the nineteenth century saw the gradual 
concentration of power in the hands of the state and the creation of 
public law, which in turn necessitated the demarcation of a distinct 
field of private law. By the end of the century, however, many lost 
confidence in the view that private law is distinct from the state and 
society. In turn, this led to the demise of the autonomous conception 
of private law.1 
 
∗ Assistant Professor, Villanova Law School. This paper is a slightly more formal 
version of the comments presented at the Private Law Beyond the State conference in 
Hamburg Germany, July 2007. The casual tone and light notation reflects the oral 
origin of these remarks. I would like to thank Ralf Michaels and Matthias Reimann 
for their helpful reactions to these comments. 
 1. See Hans-Peter Haferkamp, The Science of Private Law and the State in 
692 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 56 
The traditional narrative sees the creation of an autonomous 
private law as the work of the nineteenth-century German 
academics. Professor Haferkamp argues however, that this account 
undervalues the contributions of the nineteenth-century German 
judiciary. His paper thus moves our understanding of legal science 
away from the stereotypical emphasis on the jurist, and closer to the 
common law’s model of legal transformation via the judiciary.2 
There is a Talmudic dictum warning a student from speaking in 
front of his teachers.3 Since the little I know about nineteenth 
century German law was taught to me by scholars present in this 
room, I will heed the Talmud’s advice, and leave the discussion of the 
German legal science to Professor Haferkamp and the assembled 
experts. I thus direct my remarks to a discussion of: (i) public versus 
private law from the American perspective, (ii) an analysis of judicial 
law versus juristic law from the perspective of Jewish law, and 
finally (iii) an examination of the relationship between private law 
and legal science in each setting. Pulling these observations 
together, I conclude by questioning the viability of one of the goals of 
this conference—the creation of a transatlantic discourse anchored 
in private law scholarship. 
II.  TRANSITIONING PRIVATE INTO PUBLIC LAW 
 
Despite more than a century of critique and deconstruction, the 
distinction between private and public law continues to influence the 
structure of legal thought in the civil law world, and of late, these 
categories have even migrated to common law systems.4 Here, I join 
the voices of Professors Jansen and Michaels (and Merryman) to 
note that the contemporary American lawyer has trouble 
understanding what German scholars mean by private law.5 For 
example, in U.S. discourse, the substantive area governing the 
state’s ability to interfere with private property or contractual rights 
goes under the heading of due process and takings law, which are 
conceptualized as public rather than private law. In the American 
 
Nineteenth Century Germany, 56 AM. J. OF COMP. LAW 667 (2008). 
 2. See, e.g., Regina Ogorek, Inconsistencies and Consistencies in 19th Century 
Legal Theory, in CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: AN AMERICAN GERMAN DEBATE 
(Christian Joerges & David Trubek eds., 1989). 
 3. See Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin 63a. 
 4. See, e.g., ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW (Peter Birks ed., 2000). This two-volume 
treatise put out by Oxford’s leading legal scholars has a distinctly civilian 
organization comprising of: (i) the law of persons, (ii) the law of property, (iii) the law 
of obligations, and (iv) litigation; see also Nicholas Kasirer, English Private Law, 
Outside-in OXFORD U. COMM. L. J. 249 (2003).   
 5. See Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? 
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization 54 AM. J. COMP. LAW 843 (2006). See 
also John Merryman, The Public Law-Private Law Distinction in European and 
American Law 17 J. PUB. L. 3 (1968). 
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understanding, the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, rather than any 
body of substantive private law, is what prevents the state from 
encroaching on the private sphere. Moreover, on some readings of 
the Constitution, the entire reason for having a Constitution and 
public law is to keep the state in check vis-à-vis the private property 
rights of the citizenry. 6 
Beyond this structural difference, however, over the past 
decades, there has been a considerable shift in the interaction 
between public and private law in the United States. For example, 
officially—as a matter of blackletter doctrine—to raise a due process 
claim against the government, one must begin by identifying a right 
to property as a matter of state common (private) law.7 The Supreme 
Court continues to use this doctrinal model in cases where the 
alleged private law right fits rather neatly into traditional private 
law categories.8 However, when the cases get harder, i.e., when the 
alleged right fits less comfortably into the traditional framework of 
private law, the Court abandons the private law discourse and 
analyzes the question as a matter of federal constitutional public 
law.9 
 
 6. See Bernard H. Siegan, Protecting Economic Liberties, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 43, 64 
(2003). (“[A] major, if not the major reason that led to the framing and ratification of 
the United States Constitution, was to protect economic freedom.”); see also RICHARD 
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
 7. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding in the due 
process context that “Property interests, of course, are not created by the 
Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing 
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-
rules . . .”); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (“[t]he hallmark of 
property, the Court has emphasized is an individual entitlement grounded in state 
law”); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found, 524 U.S. 156, 165-68 (1998) (stressing in the 
takings context that the Constitution protects “traditional property law principles” 
that are “firmly embedded in the common law of the various States.”); see also 
Thomas Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 897-
98 (2000). 
 8. See Phillips, 524 U.S. at164 n.4 (1998), (addressing whether “the interest 
earned on client trust funds held by lawyers in IOLTA accounts [is] a property 
interest of the client or lawyer.”). 
 9. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (holding, in the context of 
whether plaintiff had a right to public assistance monies, that “[t]he extent to which 
procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to 
which he may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss’ . . . and depends upon whether 
the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in 
summary adjudication.”); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 535-41(1971) (seemingly 
skipping the “property” inquiry in a due process challenge to the State of Georgia’s 
decision to suspend a driver’s license); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 
436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (“[a]lthough the underlying substantive interest is created by ‘an 
independent source such as state law,’ federal constitutional law determines whether 
that interest rises to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the 
Due Process Clause.”); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (adopting an avowedly federal definition of 
what constitutes property for due process purposes in the context deciding whether 
plaintiff maintained a property interest in a false advertising claim: “The hallmark of 
a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”); Town of Castle Rock, 
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The transition from traditionally private/common law to public 
law modes of reasoning has been a major theme in twentieth-century 
American law. While the private law elements of the common law 
are still around, their prestige has dwindled considerably and courts 
are reluctant to delve deeply into their doctrines to solve novel 
cases.10 As with the due process example, the contemporary vogue is 
to frame the case as raising either procedural, statutory, or public 
law issues. Professor Haferkamp touches on an example from the 
close of the nineteenth century,11 and this phenomenon has become 
more pervasive over the course of the twentieth. The reasons are 
complex and rest on the confluence of legal realism, the relegation of 
common law to the states in Erie v. Tompkins,12 the rise of the 
administrative state, the increase in the power of the federal 
government vis-à-vis the states, the Warren Court’s image of 
constitutionalism and the conservative reaction to it, as well as 
significant changes in the goals of legal education. But while the 
causes are complex, the effects are quite stark. In a number of ways, 
the following examples highlight the extent to which American legal 
identity has shifted away from traditional conceptions of private law 
and scholarship. 
1. An examination of American law between 1940 and 1970 
would have revealed that Karl Llewellyn and Grant Gilmore were 
widely considered amongst the leading legal theorists of their 
respective generations. Gilmore’s The Ages of American Law13 and 
The Death of Contract14 are important landmarks in the narrative of 
American law, and Llewellyn is justly considered a principal 
architect of modern American legal thought.15 In light of these 
 
Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761-69 (2005) (fully enmeshing federal constitutional 
doctrines and policies into the inquiry of whether the State of Colorado meant to 
create a property interest in a court-mandated restraining order). 
 10. See Andrew Kull, The Simplification of Private Law, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 284 
(2001); Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal Doctrine, 63 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
 11. Haferkamp, supra note 1. 
 12. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 13. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). 
 14. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). 
 15. Article 2 of the U.C.C. has had a major impact of the texture and structure of 
American contract law, even in contracts not formally governed by the U.C.C. In a 
different realm, Llewellyn’s Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 
(1950), has been called, in the words of a leading scholar of statutory interpretation, 
“one of the most influential realist works of the last century” which “largely 
persuaded two generations of academics that the canons of construction were not to 
be taken seriously.” See John F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons’ Revival, 5 
THE GREEN BAG 2d 283, 283-84 (2002). The article has been cited over 550 times in 
American law journals and was even the subject of a symposium in the Vanderbilt 
Law Review. See Symposium: A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory 
Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1992). More recently Llewellyn was canonized 
by Professors David Kennedy and William Fischer in DAVID KENNEDY & WILLIAM 
FISCHER III, THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 131-61 (2006) (collection 
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accomplishments, it is easy to forget that both men were deeply 
engaged in the dark and technical corners of commercial law, and in 
fact were the drafters of Articles 2 and 9 of the U.C.C. respectively. 
In today’s environment, a scholar choosing to work in commercial 
law sends a strong signal to his academic colleagues that he aspires 
to be a legal technician rather than a high-end academic theorist.16 
And while there might be spirited debate regarding who should be 
considered this generation’s leading theorists, few nominations 
would come from the scholars involved in revisions to U.C.C. Articles 
2 and 9. Undoubtedly, the current holder of the title “leading legal 
theorist” works in a specialized area of Constitutional law. 
2. The shift away from private law is similarly evident when 
examining the heroes of the American bench. The traditional list 
would invariably include Justices Kent, Shaw, Story, Cardozo, and 
Holmes; judges who built their reputations around transforming 
traditional common law principles to new American settings.17 As 
the twentieth century progressed, however, the popular image of the 
judge shifted considerably. The new judicial heroes (or villains) are 
the makers of twentieth century constitutional law: Justices Warren, 
Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas.18 
3. Finally, transatlantic private law discourse is difficult 
because there is deep confusion as to what, exactly, is the subject of 
the conversation. As Professors Jansen and Michaels mentioned, 
private ordering (a political/ideological commitment to free markets 
and limited government intervention), rather than private law (a set 
of substantive doctrines), captures the imagination of American 
scholars. In a similar vein, recent conversations with American 
colleagues regarding the central issues in American private law 
produced the following themes: (i) tort reform (curbing liability of 
large corporations at the hands of state court juries), (ii) bankruptcy 
reform (making debt collection easier for banks and credit card 
companies), (iii) issues regarding the scope and distribution of 
intellectual property rights, (iv) post-Enron questions of corporate 
 
includes Llewellyn’s Some Realism about Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931)). 
 16. See Larry Garvin, The Strange Death of Academic Commercial Law, 68 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 403 (2007). 
 17. See GEORGE EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES 
OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES (1988). 
 18. For the benefit of the German readers: Chief Justice Earl Warren presided 
over the Supreme Court from 1953-69. The Warren court significantly expanded the 
scope of Constitutional rights that citizens could assert against the government. 
Associate Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall were the most liberal 
members of the Warren Court. By contrast, Chief Justice William Rehnquist (1986-
2005) presided over a far more conservative court that rejected the Warren Court’s 
legacy of social transformation through constitutional law. Associate Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas are the leading exponents of originalism and 
textualism—interpretive methods designed to constrain the “legislation from the 
bench” that has come to typify the Warren Court. 
. 
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governance, and (v) the advisability of setting limits on executive 
compensation. 
Whatever the merits of these proposals, these issues are private 
only in the most nominal sense of the term—they govern 
relationships between non-governmental entities. On the whole, 
however, they are conceptualized as questions of public policy that 
concern the administration of the national economy writ large. To be 
sure, conservative and liberal scholars vigorously debate the 
appropriate regulatory response to each issue. But the idea that 
legal questions can be resolved on the basis of a confined set of 
conceptually-related doctrines, or via application of the principles of 
corrective justice, is a position that few American liberals or 
conservatives are willing to promote.19 
For these reasons I have argued that Peter Birks, a leading 
figure of Anglo-Continental private law thought in the late twentieth 
century, would have had difficulty securing tenure at even a third-
tier American law school. This is true not only for Birks himself, but 
for any scholar whose approach to private law is predicated on the 
assumption that private law can be reduced to a confined set of legal 
doctrines where taxonomic classification does the work of solving the 
law’s hard questions. For example, in discussing when a claimant 
can pull certain assets out of a bankrupt estate, Birks wrote: 
Some legal concepts [property] ought never to be 
deconstructed . . . . 
 
 19. For example, both the conservative and liberal wings of the U.S. Supreme 
Court maintain a thoroughly instrumentalist understanding of tort law that sees no 
differences between a common law tort action and an act of positive regulation 
enacted by the legislature. The Court’s conservatives argued that “[state] regulation 
can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of 
preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to 
be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.” Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 510 (1996) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia 
and Thomas, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting San Diego 
Building Trades Council v. Gaimon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)). Similarly, the more 
liberal Justice Breyer maintains that distinguishing between private law tort claims 
and positive legislation “would grant greater power . . . to a single state jury than to 
state officials acting through state administrative or legislative lawmaking 
processes.” Id. at 504. See also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871-72 
(2000) (Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, rejected the distinction between 
common law tort actions and legislative regulatory regimes). 
These statements contrast with the more traditional understanding that 
distinguished between “common law damages actions” and “positive enactments such 
as statutes and regulations.” In articulating this view, Justice Blackmun based 
himself on a corrective justice theory that contrasts private law with positive acts of 
state regulation. (“Tort law has an entirely separate function—compensating 
victims—that sets it apart from direct forms of regulation.”) See Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 535-38 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See more 
generally Michael P. Moreland, Tort Reform by Regulation, 1 J. HEALTH & LIFE 
SCIENCES L. 39 (2007). 
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The question whether a claim deserves priority in 
insolvency is an impossible question. By contrast, the 
questions whether the plaintiff has a proprietary interest, 
and, if so, from what moment that interest takes its 
priority, are technical conceptual questions, which a lawyer 
can hope to answer. 
. . . Lawyers have no special competence in distributive 
justice. They cannot be expected to say who deserves what. 
But, given a decent law library and some time to do the 
work, a lawyer can be expected to say . . . whether on given 
facts a proprietary interest has arisen, and, if so, precisely 
of what kind.20 
I can hardly imagine a statement more inimical to the entire 
thrust of twentieth-century American jurisprudence than these lines 
penned by Birks. This is because the defining feature of American 
legal thought is that traditional legal analysis is usually 
indeterminate and that outcomes could no longer be legitimated via 
the technical and conceptual analysis of legal rules.21 For this 
reason, when I gave presentations at a number of U.S. law schools 
and put these statements of Birks on a power-point slide, the room 
quickly fell silent, save for the gasps of shock from the assembled 
professors. American academics literally could not believe that one of 
the most renowned figures of the English legal academy was so 
blatantly oblivious to the ideas that we have insisted on for over 
seventy years.22 
III.  JEWISH LEGAL SCIENCE 
Like American and German law, Jewish law also saw the 
flowering of legal science during the nineteenth century.23 However, 
because nineteenth-century Jews had neither a state nor politics in 
the usual sense of the term, the traditional explanation for the 
emergence of legal science—the separation of law from politics—does 
not directly apply to the Jewish experience. Moreover, the mutual 
 
 20. Peter Birks, The End of the Remedial Constructive Trust? 12 TR. L. INT’L 
202, 214-15 (1998). 
 21. For a comparative perspective, see James Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy 
Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517 
(2006). 
 22. See Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the 
Global Restitution Party, 28 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 99 (2008); For a comparison of 
American and German perspectives, see Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The 
Trasnatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. 
German Doctrinalism, available at ssrn.com/abstract=1019437. 
 23. See Chaim Saiman, Legal Theology: The Turn To Conceptualism in 
Nineteenth Century Jewish Law, 21 J. L. & RELIGION 39-42, 94-100 (2005) 
[hereinafter Saiman, Legal Theology]. 
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hostility between the early Zionists and the traditional Jewish 
scholars meant that the rabbinic tradition would play a relatively 
minor role in the nascent phases of Jewish statehood. Nevertheless, 
expanding the definition of politics to encompass non-state social 
movements reveals that Jewish legal science performed many of the 
same functions as its German and American counterparts. In each 
case, scholars sought to chisel out a block of law untainted by the 
influences of society and polity. 
Jewish legal science was a response to the threat represented by 
Reform Judaism or its academic manifestation, Wissenschaft des 
Judentums. The Wissenschaft movement employed nineteenth-
century German historical and text-critical methods to contextualize 
and demystify the formation of classical Judaism’s core texts. While 
this project had its academic ends, its political goals were to enable 
Jewish assimilation into European society. These writers claimed 
that Jewish law and identity were far more contingent and 
malleable than assumed by traditional theology. The reformers 
argued that just as Jewish civilization had continually adapted to 
social and material conditions throughout the ages, the same should 
hold true as Jews moved out of the ghetto and into mainstream 
European society. 24 
Against this backdrop, traditionalist legal scholars, known as 
“Briskers,” offered a version of Jewish law that was both apolitical 
and trans- or meta-historical. In terms of Western movements, this 
school bears similarity to the seventeenth-century view of the 
common law promulgated by Lord Edward Coke,25 and the mid 
nineteenth-century form of German law that has come to be known 
as the “conceptual school” (Begriffsjurisprudenz). The Briskers 
denied that Jewish law responded to shifting understandings of 
human nature and society, and claimed instead that Jewish law was 
based on immutable legal principles that were independent of 
contingent social forces. The scientific approach, according to the 
Briskers, revealed that apparent changes to the legal order were 
predicated on preexisting legal concepts embedded within classical 
rabbinic texts, simply awaiting discovery by Jewish legal scientists. 
IV.  JURISTS’ LAW VS. JUDGES’ LAW 
Professor Haferkamp’s paper calls attention to the different 
ways that judges rather than jurists employed the concepts of legal 
science. Though Jewish law maintained a distinction between 
learned law (torah lishma) and the law that actually gets applied 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Gerald Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence, 2 OXFORD U. 
COMM. L. J. 155, 155-57, 169-76 (2002). 
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(halakha le’maaseh) since late antiquity,26 this distinction became 
more important over the course of the nineteenth century, when the 
role of the academic legal scholar was increasingly separated from 
judicial authority. While academic jurists generally focused on 
training future scholars and writing Talmudic commentaries, the 
work of rendering decisions was typically assumed by a posek, a 
scholar who became known as a decisor of Jewish law. (The very 
strangeness of the word decisor underscores the difficulty of 
comparing Jewish law to national law.) Somewhat paradoxically, the 
popular conception of Jewish law was driven by the learned law of 
the jurists rather than the decisions produced by the judge/posek. 27 
In the Jewish context, the distinction between scholar and judge 
enabled legal scientists to present the law as an autonomous 
discipline. The scientists’ work stressed the conceptual unity and 
purity of a legal system untouched by the vicissitudes of the ages 
and untangled in what Langdell famously called the “skein of human 
affairs.”28 It was this autonomous image of Jewish law that was 
espoused in public and used to refute the claims of the Jewish 
reformers. Invariably, however, Jewish law had to come to terms 
with the issues of the day and address what we (but not they) call 
“the social.” Here, the system reverted to a judge/posek who could 
quietly contravene the official jurist-law by finding a localized 
exception that applied only to the unique facts of a specific case. The 
work of the judge/posek allowed the law to change in practice even as 
the juristic discourse reaffirmed the immutable nature of the ancient 
principles of Jewish law. 
V.  LEGAL SCIENCE AND PRIVATE LAW 
In light of the Jewish and American experiences, Professor 
Haferkamp’s paper raises the question: to what extent the emerging 
prominence and independence of the German judiciary relieved the 
academic jurists from having to accommodate social considerations 
into their vision of law? In short, to what extent did judicial 
accommodationism enable academics to adopt their pedantic view of 
the Pandects? 
A number of conference papers have already alluded to the 
connection between the legal science and private law, and if we are 
to follow Professor Gordley’s suggestion, there is a deep connection 
between the death of traditional legal science and the death of 
private law.29 Moreover, in each of the German, American, and 
 
 26. See e.g., HANINA BEN-MENAHEM, JUDICIAL DEVIATION IN TALMUDIC LAW 
(1991). 
 27. See Saiman, Legal Theology, supra note 23. 
 28. See CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS viii (2d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1879). 
 29. James Gordley, PLEASE INSERT TITLE 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 641 (2008). 
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Jewish contexts, traditional legal science proves most useful when 
addressing “core” private law doctrines of contract, tort, agency, and 
property, but tends to run out of steam when confronting social and 
political considerations that do not easily conform to doctrinal-
analytic categories. 
In terms of German law, the story has been told by many of the 
papers and needs no further elaboration. I would merely reiterate 
that the traditional, and to some degree ongoing, assumption is that 
core areas of private law are like the primary colors on an artist’s 
palate—the basic doctrines from which more complex forms are 
derived.30 Therefore, one must have a firm mastery of the basics 
before proceeding to more complex forms of contract and transaction. 
Regarding the American common law, it is not surprising that 
the heyday of legal science in the late nineteenth century saw to it 
that contract, tort, and property dominated the first-year 
curriculum.31 Conversely, more recent skepticism about the existence 
of “core private law doctrines” has lead to these subjects gradually 
receding from first-year curriculum.32 
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the relationship 
between legal science and private law comes from the debates 
surrounding the formation of the University of Chicago’s law school 
at the turn of the twentieth century. The Chicagoans sought to 
borrow one of the leading legal scientists, Professor J.H. Beale of 
Harvard, to serve as the inaugural dean of the new law school. 
Initially, there was considerable excitement over the idea of 
“establish[ing] a school on the model of Harvard.”33 However, when 
 
 30. See Nicholas Kasirer, The Common Core of European Private Law in Boxes 
and Bundles, 3 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF PRIVATE LAW 417 (2003) (discussing the use of 
visual imagery in comparative law). 
 31. For example, when Harvard’s three-year curriculum was adopted in 1916, 
the law school offered twelve (12) credits of Property, eight (8) credits of Equity, six 
(6) credits of Contracts, seven (7) credits of Torts, and four (4) credit classes in: (i) 
Agency, (ii) Corporations, (iii) Partnerships, (iv) Shipping, (v) Sales, (vi) Bills of 
Exchange, (vii) Trusts, and (viii) Mortgages and Suretyships. Incidentally, the only 
“public law” courses that were offered were four (4) credits of Constitutional Law and 
two (2) credits of Municipal Corporations. Interestingly, in 1880, Constitutional law 
only merited one credit and before that, it did not even merit its own course, as it 
was taught as “Constitutional Law and Shipping.” See John Reed, Training for the 
Public Profession of the Law 458 (1921); E. Gordon Gee & Donald W. Jackson, 
Following the Leader: The Unexamined Consensus of Law School Curricula 20 
(1975); see also Robert Gordon, The Geologic Strata of the Law School Curriculum, 60 
VAND. L. R. 339 (2007). 
 32. In 2006, Harvard Law School initiated a major overhaul of its first year 
curriculum which introduces new mandatory first-year courses by “devoting fewer 
class hours the traditional first-year curriculum.” See Harvard faculty unanimously 
approves first-year curricular reform, available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2006/10/06_curriculum.php (last visited Aug. 21, 
2007). For the 2007-08 academic year, contracts, torts, and property were reduced to 
four credits each. See also Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method and 
What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609 (2007). 
 33. FRANK ELLSWORTH, LAW ON THE MIDWAY 68 (1977). See also Thomas Grey, 
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Harvard’s traditionalists heard that the proposed curriculum 
included not only contracts, torts, property, and agency, but also 
international law, administrative law, public officers, municipal 
corporations, and federal practice, the atmosphere cooled 
considerably. Beale, an advocate of what he called “pure law,” saw 
the differences between Harvard and Chicago as “so fundamental 
that it is obviously necessary to choose one conception of the school 
or the other,”34 thus declaring that he “could be of no use in . . . a 
school” following Chicago’s path.35 
While Jewish law does not maintain a distinction between 
public and private law, the Talmudic corpus does contain a vast body 
of law that roughly corresponds to what civilian lawyers call private 
law: contract, tort, property, agency, inheritance, trust, and family 
law. Moreover, the structure of reasoning promoted by the 
nineteenth-century Jewish legal scientists bears many similarities to 
the contemporaneous private law discourse of German and American 
scholars. Like the Roman jurists, the rabbis were far more adept at 
rationalizing fairly discrete rules of substantive private law than 
they were at discussing political theory, the legitimate scope of 
governmental power, constitutionalism, or most of what we call 
regulatory and administrative policy. Moreover, the rabbinic focus 
on conceptual private law questions is all the more notable since the 
Talmudic rules of contract were hardly the most pressing issue to a 
traditional society being ripped apart by the social-political forces of 
Zionism, communism, and rampant assimilation. 
The intimate connection between private law and legal science 
in German, American, and Jewish law raises important questions. 
From the perspective of intellectual history, it gives us reason to 
consider the degree to which the flourishing of legal science is 
intrinsically associated with the substantive doctrines of traditional 
private law. But the issue is of more than historical interest. One of 
the central themes of this conference is whether the vacuum left by 
the shrinking nation state can be filled by a discourse of academic 
private law which looks beyond it.36 While today’s legal science is 
substantially different than that of the nineteenth-century 
dogmatists, the weight of Savigny’s tradition (and the Roman one 
that stands behind it), continues to direct scholarly inquiry towards 
the traditional areas of Roman private law. Thus, European scholars 
have expended significant efforts identifying the common doctrines, 
 
Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1983). 
 34. ELLSWORTH, supra note 33, at 72. 
 35. Id. at 69. 
 36. See Michaels & Jansen, supra note 5, at 20-21; 26-27; REINHARD 
ZIMMERMAN, ROMAN LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAW, EUROPEAN LAW: THE CIVILIAN 
TRADITION TODAY (2001). 
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frames of reference, cores, and principles of European private law. 37 
Of late, even the historically recalcitrant English lawyers seem to be 
moving away from the common law’s traditional jurisdictional 
framing and speaking in the civilianized language of private law, the 
law of obligations and unjust enrichment.38 
To the best of my understanding, the theory behind these 
harmonizing projects is that initial efforts should be directed 
towards the foundational and settled legal doctrines, which can then 
serve as the basis for engaging in more complex and contemporary 
legal problems. But whatever its logic in the Anglo-Continental 
setting, from the American vantage point, the Europeans are 
searching for something that either does not exist, or at the very 
least, is not all that important. To the extent there is a “common 
core” of American law, it is certainly anchored in questions of 
Constitutional law rather than the areas of traditional private law 
that are subject to the vagaries of state courts and legislatures. 
Moreover, even in those instances when doctrinal diversity amongst 
the several states is seen as problematic, American law most 
typically responds—not by looking to harmonize the substantive 
 
 37. See, e.g., Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) prepared by the 
Commission on European Contract Law (Lando Commission), 
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/; see also the 
various texts published by the Study Group on a European Civil Code, 
http://www.sgecc.net; the Acquis-Group, http://www.acquis-group.org; the European 
Group on Tort Law (Tilburg Group), http://www.egtl.org; the Common Core of 
European Private Law Group (Trento Group), http://www.jus.unitn.it/dsg/common-
core or the Academy of European Private Lawyers (Gandolfi Group), 
http://www.accademiagiusprivatistieuropei.it/. For more information on the Common 
Frame of Reference Project launched by the E.U. Commission and the relevant E.U. 
documents, see, e.g., 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/index_en.h
tm#developments. See also Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of 
Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 
671, 690-95 (2002). 
 38. E.g., ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW, supra note 4; ANDREW TETTENBORN, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (1984); PETER BIRKS, UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT (2005); Andrew Burrows, We Do This at Common Law and this at 
Equity, 22 OXFORD J. L. STUDS. 1 (2002); see also the inter-Commonwealth listserv 
named the Obligations Discussion Group, archived at 
<http://www.ucc.ie/law/odg/home.htm.>. For a critical evaluation of these efforts, see 
e.g., STEVE HEDLEY, RESTITUTION: ITS DIVISION AND ORDERING (2001) (critiquing 
Peter Birks); J.N. Adams, How Not to do Things with Rules, 5 OXFORD J. L. STUDS. 
446 (1985) (critical review of TETTENBORN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS). Recently the 
Australian High Court has taken to criticizing the increasing civil law tenor of 
English law, see e.g., Farah Constructions Pty Ltd. v. Say-Dee Pty Ltd, [2007] HCA 
22 at 154 (AU) (“[t]he restitution basis reflects a mentality in which considerations of 
ideal taxonomy prevail over a pragmatic approach to legal development.”); 
Roxborough v. Rothmans, [2001] 208 CLR 516 at 544 and (“[t]o the lawyer whose 
mind has been moulded by civilian influences, the theory may come first, and the 
source of the theory may be the writing of jurists not the decisions of judges. 
However, that is not the way in which a system based on case law develops; over 
time, general principle is derived from judicial decisions upon particular instances, 
not the other way around.”). 
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rules of private law—but by pulling the issue out of its private law 
framing and recasting it as a constitutional, federal or procedural 
issue.39 Because the core of American law revolves around the 
tension between individual liberties and the powers of the nation 
state, Americans are not quite ready to join their European brothers 
in looking beyond. 
 
 
 39. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999 (2008); Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co. 529 U.S. 861, 871-72 (2000) (federal preemption of private law tort 
actions); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (granting federal 
district courts greater authority in diversity class action suits and make removal 
easier so as to prevent forum shopping in state courts); Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 
508 U.S. 248 (1993); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 
(2002) (emaciation of trust law through the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
ERISA). 
